Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a longer statement

which I would like to submit to the record and just summarize

here.

Thank you. It is both a pleasure and honor to be

here. In answering your question on what are Russian policy foreign

objectives, my answer is it depends on who you ask in Russia.

In making our assessments of Russia’s behavior in the world, I

think it is absolutely critical that we realize that Russia today is

not a totalitarian state dominated by the central community of the

Communist Party, the Soviet Union. That state disappeared in

1991.

Rather, Russia is a democratizing state, a weakly institutionalized

democracy with a lot of deficiencies, but a democratizing statement

nonetheless. Consequently, Russia’s foreign policy is a product

of domestic politics, competitive domestic politics in Russia

today.

That system is highly unstable and highly erratic with poor institutions,

unlike our own; but the policies that we see throughout the

world are a product of domestic politics in Russia. It is not too

much unlike the debate I heard here earlier this morning between

you. I heard lots of different foreign policies. Had a Russian walked

in and asked different ones of you, he might have had five or six

different ideas about what American foreign policy is today. I think

we need to remind ourselves that it is precisely the situation you

have in Russia today.

Now, there are a few things that most Russians agree upon.

First, they all recognize that resolving Russia’s economic decline

and internal weakness is a precondition for establishing Russia as

a great international power again today. You cannot be an international

actor if your economy is the size of Illinois, no offense to

Illinois; nor can you be a serious international player if you can’t

control your own borders. Everybody recognizes that.

Second, all Russian actors agree that Russia must pursue economic,

political, and military integration within the Commonwealth

of Independent States. Russia, quite frankly, wants to continue to

have a sphere of influence in the Commonwealth of Independent

States. There is little disagreement in Russia today about that.

Third, most leaders, not all, but most leaders in Russia believe

that Russia’s nuclear arsenal is the one power attribute that still

accords Russia special status in the international system, just as

General Scowcroft said. As a consequence they do not want to lose

that. That is where it ends, though. That is where the consensus

ends.

After that, on virtually every other major foreign policy issue, I

think there is major disagreement in Russia; and to understand

what the policy is, one needs to understand who is up and who is

down in terms of Russian domestic politics.

Let me spell out for you four different camps in Russia which I

think the ebb and flow of them are important to understanding the

conduct of Russian foreign policy.

First, there are what I call the pro-Western idealists. These are

individuals and parties who have a normative commitment to integrating

Russia into the Western community of democratic states.

They believe that Russia is best served by becoming an integral

member of the West.

This group includes the liberal reformers that dominated the government

in the earlier part of this decade, personified first and

foremost by former Foreign Minister Kozyrev. They dominated in

1992 and 1993. Their power has waned ever since; and today they

are marginal actors in the definition of Russian foreign policy, but

they are still players nonetheless.

The second group is what I call the pro-Western pragmatists.

This group also believes that Russian interests are best served by

Russian integration with the West, but they believe this for material,

economic reasons, not for normative reasons. They are not

what I would call democrats with a small ‘‘D’’ necessarily. Rather,

they are economic actors that see a win-win situation in terms of

Russia integrating into the West.

This includes companies like Gazprom, the largest gas company

in the world, oil companies, mineral exporters, high-tech enterprises

and large financial organizations. There are also a few important

Governors that I would put in this camp, as well as a

whole host of Russian nongovernmental organizations, church

groups, trade unions, student associations, and women organizations

that also believe that it is in Russia’s interest to integrate

into the West.

Former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin is the leading political

figure in Russia that I would identify with this camp; and also,

by the way, I would say that the majority of Russian citizens also

were in this camp, although that has changed in the last month.

From 1993 until August 1998 this group dominated the definition

of Russian foreign policy and, depending on the issue, they still

play a very important role in the conduct of Russian foreign affairs

abroad.

Third group I would label—and this might sound a bit like an

oxymoron, but as the anti-Western pragmatist. Like the second

group, this group believes that influence in foreign policy debates

and the definition of foreign policy should be driven first and foremost

by Russian interests and not norms, morals, or revolutionary

missions.

However, this group does not believe that integration in the West

is a win-win situation for Russia. Rather, they look to the world to

be a zero-sum game competition between Russia and the West; and

so if America is up, that means Russia is going down.

They look at the world as a unipolar world today, dominated by

the United States; and they want to do everything they can to destroy

American hegemony and create what they term a multipolar

world.

However, this group are pragmatists. They are well aware of

Russia’s weakness, and so they realize in the short term they need

Western engagement but not necessarily to integrate with the

West, but actually to compete with the West.

In this group I would say that Prime Minister—or I should say

former Prime Minister Primakov, is the leading proponent of this

view. Many nationalist groups I would put in this group as well,

directors of military enterprises, some, but not all, within the ministry

of defense, and the Russian intelligence community. From August

1998 until today, literally this morning, this group dominated

the definition of Russian foreign policy.

Then my fourth group, finally, are what I call the anti-Western

ideologies. These folks are passionately anti-Western. They are motivated

by norms, ideological beliefs, sometimes ethnic,

civilizational kinds of things; and they promote a kind of foreign

policy that is actually not in Russia’s national interest, at least

from my point of view.

This includes Mr. Zhirinovsky, the head of the Liberal Democratic

Party. It includes many, many members of the Russian Communist

Party today and even more radical groups on both the left

and the right.

This group gets a lot of attention in the West for the things they

say about foreign policy, but I think it is important to realize that

they have never been in control of foreign policy in Russia and are

unlikely to be in control of Russian foreign policy in the near future.

Let me turn briefly to Kosovo to illustrate how these different

groups have competed for influence and how it influences the conduct

of Russian foreign policy.

The initial reaction to Kosovo was dominated by the anti-Western

ideologies. If you looked and you saw the camera shots outside

of the American embassy, it was Zhirinovsky out there. It was the

Communists out there, throwing beer cans and talking about Western

imperialism. They were in charge; and it seemed for a time, by

the way, that they would push Russian policy in directions that I

think would not have served Russia’s national interest.

However, the second phase of the Russian policy was not dominated

by them. Russia did not go to war to help their Serbian

brothers, i.e., norms, ethnic ties, rather than interests. Rather, Mr.

Primakov realized that that was not in Russia’s interests, and the

second phase of Kosovo—Russian policy toward Kosovo was dominated

by the anti-Western pragmatists.

They understood that Russia was too weak to do anything in

this; and yet, they were motivated first and foremost to try to

weaken the NATO alliance, to try to split the NATO alliance, and

try to make this a losing proposition for the United States and,

consequently, a winning proposition for Russia.

That group lost control of the policy. When Mr. Yeltsin appointed

former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the pro-Western pragmatists

took over the definition of Russian foreign policy; and after

Primakov’s dismissal this morning—by the way, I would add they

are now firmly in the driver’s seat until at least the next go-around

in terms of the definition of Russia’s policy toward Kosovo.

They believe that this is a win-win situation. They welcome the

chance to be on the international stage, and they want to cooperate

in a way with the NATO alliance to find a win-win situation in

Kosovo.

Think about that. In the period of 4 weeks, Russian foreign policy

had three different policies on Kosovo. If I had more time, I

could walk you through a whole range of different foreign policy

issues where you would see the exact same fluctuations and tendencies.

There is important lessons here, and I will be brief about what

this means for U.S.-Russia relations. First, it means that we cannot

assume some static foreign policy coming out of Russia. On the

contrary, it is a very volatile situation domestically, and that

means that Russian foreign policy is also going to be very volatile.

Now, in the short run I think that is negative and very bad. Who

do you talk to? Who are your partners over there? It is difficult to

know. In the long run, I think that keeps the door open that I

would call the pro-Western pragmatists and even the pro-Western

idealists might win out in Russia.

Today they’re down and out. Today they don’t dominate on most

issues, but it is simply too early to say this game is over. This

game is not over. I am a big fan of the NBA, watching a lot of NBA

games. You turn it on in the second quarter and your team is down

20 points, you are a really foolish person to think that that is going

to be the end of the game.

Right now, I think we are in the second quarter of our relationship.

It is a long ways until we know the outcome of Russia’s domestic

politics; and we have to keep in mind, therefore, that positive

outcomes down the road may be possible.

Finally, let me leave you with one last fact. The very fact that

Russian groups are arguing and competing for interest about foreign

policy, to me, is also a positive sign. This is a great, vast improvement

over when we just read central Committee directives

about what the Soviet Communist Party believed Soviet national

interest in the world were.

The vigor of their debate and the range of opinions in Russia are

almost as heated and vigorous as the ones you hear in your own

building, and I think that is a positive sign for Russian democracy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I should say that I am

not an advocate of further IMF funding. I do not see a record of

achievement under the Primakov Government in terms of economic

reform. They have not done elementary things, and so I do not

think it is—you shouldn’t reward inactivity.

Having said that, the one rationale I could see for providing

those funds is simply to avoid making the situation worse, but

what IMF is talking about is simply take one check from one bank

account and putting it in the other. They are not actually talking

about transferring new money, and that would help Russia avoid

further disaster.

Having said that, I think there is a real mystery going on in the

Russian economy and, that is, our dire predictions from July of last

year and after the financial crisis simply have not come true. If you

look at the statistics just released last week, inflation is only 3 percent

in April.

They are collecting more taxes last month than they did throughout

the whole previous year. We do not have a good understanding

of what is going on there. I suspect it is the state sort of buying

time. I don’t suspect it is fundamental economic reform, but I

should note that we are pretty confused in terms of what is going

on in the economy.

Very briefly to go through your list.

Two seconds. On satellite launchers, of course we

should not punish Khrunichev and Lockheed, by the way, in this.

It simply makes no sense. They are definitely part of what I call

this pro-Western pragmatists. I actually worked at that company

in the early 1990’s, and there is no doubt in my mind that they see

cooperation with the West as in their interest and in our interest.

On the ABM treaty, this is to me is a clear example of where

emotion is trumping interests in Russia, and that to me says we

have an opportunity to work with them, and I think there is lots

of opportunities there. The ministry of defense officials are not as

militantly anti-ABM and anti-ballistic missile defense as some of

the politicians in the Duma.

Finally, on NATO, I would just agree with General Scowcroft and

let us keep the door open all the way to Russia.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank

you, Mr. Gejdenson.

Mr. Cooksey.

Pragmatists, excuse me.

Yes, that would be correct.

If you look at the evolution of that policy, what was

very clear from, say, 1996 to 1998 is that the pragmatist were

blocking it, right. There was a lot of rhetoric about yeah, yeah,

yeah, we all need to get together, but in fact, if you looked at the

policy, it was Russia blocking it because it wasn’t in their economic

interest.

When Mr. Primakov took over, he pushed more for that because

it was seen as some kind of balancing against the United States

which to me also seems absurd, but that is the way they framed

it.

There is a lot of hesitation right now. There is a big debate going

on. I suspect that as we get into the Russian electoral cycle, nobody

is going to want to say I am against this unification; and so you

are going to see a lot of rhetoric about, yes, of course, I am for it.

However, I wouldn’t expect it to happen anytime soon. I suspect

after the election you might see the pragmatists reassert themselves

on that policy.

Not what should have been done.

I want to make one comment as a social scientist,

and then I will give you my views, which is that if you think about

what I said about Russian foreign policy, I think there is a lot very

similar about American foreign policy.

What is wrong about what is going on today is that we do not

have a shared definition of objectives in foreign policy. Think about

10 years ago—you could say our strategy was containment of Communism,

and there might be some people who would disagree; but

most people, both in the Congress and the executive branch, would

agree with that.

Today, we don’t have that shared strategy; and, therefore, we tiptoe

into things. People don’t agree on the objectives; and, therefore,

they disagree vehemently about the means.

My own view is that it was right to do something about it, that

we had to do something. You cannot—both for, I think, moralistic

reasons you cannot just sit by and watch genocide in Europe if you

are serious about being a power in Europe—and I think we should

be—but that we have to have the means lined up with the ends.

That is where I think our mistake has been.

Today, of course, because there is not consensus about plying

what I think are the right means to solve this, then I think we

have to go for resolution. We have to do it with the Russians on

board, and I do not see having the Russians being on board so far.

I see it as a win for American foreign policy, not as some slippage

so far, but we cannot allow—we have to now stay to the same objectives

that we started from the get-go.

This is not about a marriage contract or some sort—negotiation

is even the wrong word. There is nothing to negotiate about. In my

opinion, there is nothing to negotiate. We have our terms, and until

those terms are met we have to——

Yes.

Unfortunately, I do and with one amendment—

that I absolutely believe it has to be that American forces have to

be part of that component; if you don’t do that, then you don’t

achieve your primary objective, which is to get the Kosovars back,

and that is the important words to remember.

I would like to concur with that. I think that is

right. What troubles me is because of the way of our own domestic

politics in this country that we do not have the support either for

the objectives or for the means of achieving those objectives.